essay also explores the need for science to engage with social and ethical relations in the world, within the context of contemporary public and political arguments about the dangers of nuclear energy. Twenty years later, these discussions carry a particularly pertinent resonance with current debates about the politics of global developments in nuclear fuel, the environment and sustainable sources of energy production.

... she also questions whether scientific disciplines allow or disallow the sexed subject to legitimately exist, as authors and subjects.

Thus, in the context of architectural thinking and practice, Irigaray's discussions of science not only indicate some of the limits of scientific method for the discipline - especially the formalist use of geometric space - but she also questions whether scientific disciplines allow or disallow the sexed subject to legitimately exist, as authors and subjects. Women architects who have examined fluid expressions of geometric thinking include Martine de Maeseneer's Lambrecht House and New Slaten Housing projects, which are developed out of a topological organisation of domestic spaces that discourage linearity. or Françoise-Hélène Jourda's international school complex in Lyons, developed out of complex geometries that aim to subvert deterministic spatial organisation (Hughes 1996, pp. 26–51 and pp. 52–73).

Dialogue

How do geometric drawings define internal and external spaces?

How can architects use geometry as a positive technique in design?

What benefits of non-geometric design might there be?

Can architecture exist without geometry or science, or does its use of these disciplines need to be rethought?

How can sexed thinking improve scientific thinking in architecture?

CHAPTER 7

Bridges, Envelopes and Horizons

Irigaray's criticism of scientific thinking in philosophy and psychoanalysis extends to discussions about architecture, when architects ignore contingency in the design, construction and use of buildings; for example, when architectural design is defined as the systematic production of spatial ideas that take little or no account of the client, environmental context or user. Such rigid and inflexible definitions of the discipline rely upon limited scientific definitions of space and result in symbolic and instrumental methods of construction that do not reflect the physical and material complexity of its processes. However, this chapter also shows that Irigaray develops a theory of sexed spaces or architectures that are developed out of fluid, temporal, multi-sensory and multi-dimensional spaces.

In the second part of this chapter I therefore explore these productive heterogeneous and irreducible sexed spatio-temporalities or architectures.

Irreducible spatio-temporality

Irigaray interrogates philosophical and psychoanalytic theories of space to show that systematic and unsexed theories of space prevent the 'sexed subject' from actually existing. Under these conditions, space is restricted to either a scientific
concept, or a formless idea. According to Irigaray, the physical sciences, mathematics, and systematic forms of architecture characterise space as: formal, objective, divided, rational, static, symmetrical, unchanging, quantitative, programmatic, external or discrete geometric figures. Such rational accounts of space divide the world into a system of geometric regions and objects into which the individual is placed, and in which similarity and symmetry dominate. Alternatively, she argues that when space is defined as irrational, unintelligible or abstract, it shares its characteristics with women. Both are considered to be formless, excessive, unknowable, unconscious, inaccessible or fragmented. Moreover, in either case, space is reduced to a homogenous and binary value-system; it is either formal space or formless space.

In addition, Irigaray also shows how these unsexed accounts of space also determine ideas about time. Within this traditional hierarchy, time is the 'hand-maiden' of space, imitating and repeating the same dominant relationships and structures. Once again, woman is also associated with time's irrational, indeterminate, unstable and impermanent qualities. Alternatively, when time is defined through rational measurement or the successive repetition of finite units (i.e. rational numbers), women are also assigned the secondary, negative value in the system (i.e. the number 2 always follows after the number 1, and women are second to men). Therefore, women can be associated with an infinite form of rational time. But here, once again, the law of self-similarity defines infinity and women, because it is a repetition of identical values derived from the number 1. Consequently, time and the sexed subject, are limited to infinite imitations of a rational space or a rational number.

According to Irigaray, these limited understandings of space and time therefore determine the way in which the female subject (woman) can operate: either she is rejected from 'proper' scientific space and time or she is associated with the problematic, yet dependent, ideas of formless and timeless space. Neither option offers a 'proper' way to think about space for the sexed subject. In the first part of this chapter, therefore, I look at how these unknowable or immeasurable spaces are negative versions of the sexed subject and sexed space in figures, such as abysses or 'holes'.

Yet Irigaray also draws out a 'third' mode of spatial relations in which the sexed subject is an actively thinking and sensing person. The negative figures of infinite space and time therefore also reveal the other side of Irigaray's double-thinking, which embodies the positive expression of the sexed subject and the sexed spaces in which she and he can live. These spaces are heterogeneous, topological, irreducible (i.e. they are not reducible to absolute forms or shapes), multi-dimensional, aesthetic, qualitative, deep, psychic, physical and enduring. So, in the second part of the chapter, I explore sexed spaces and poetic spatio-temporal relations (e.g. envelopes, volumes, horizons and bridges) that demonstrate how sexed space and sexed time are irreducible to finite symbols or representations. As a result, Irigaray's writing can offer architects poetic and productive ways through which to construct sexed and sensing histories, practices and interpretations of architecture.

**Blind spots, holes and gaps**

For the architect, Irigaray's critique of the limits in symbolic representations of space and time raise interesting questions about what can or cannot be legitimately described in architectural space, and what aspects of life may be deemed to fall outside its powers of representation; for example, how do architectural conventions of drawing, modelling and writing enable the production of different spatial senses? What ideas and subjects are omitted or overlooked in these processes? What subjects are considered to be too complex for architectural design, and are therefore rejected as excessive or unnecessary to its aims? How successful is architecture at developing spaces for specific users, if it does not take into account the needs and desires of the sexed subject? (Later in this chapter I give some examples of architectural practices through which to examine some of these questions.)

In *Speculum, This Sex, and An Ethics of Sexual Difference* Irigaray examines the way in which the sexed subject is considered to be outside norms of representation, for example, in the form of spatial figures, such as 'holes' and 'abysses'. In these discussions, Irigaray draws attention to the way in which space is considered to be infinite because it is immeasurable, unquantifiable or outside the structures that represent the world in finite and rational forms.
Irigaray, these discussions therefore reveal the inadequacy of modern symbolic or instrumental systems that limit space and time to finite representations.

Holes and blind spots are present in Irigaray's first publication, Speculum, especially in her view that Freud fails to represent the actual social and sexual experiences of girls and women. In the first essay of the book, 'The blind spot of an old dream of symmetry', Irigaray accuses Freud of constructing female sexuality on the basis of 'blind spots', 'voids', 'holes', and the lack of a proper 'original' female sex organ. For Irigaray, Freud misses woman out of his examination of sexual experience - she is a 'hole' in his argument - because she is only present when her sex is 'substituted' with a man's sex. Furthermore, her 'lacking' sexual powers are considered to be a threat to male sexual identity, for example, in the myth of the castration complex. Irigaray spells this out in no uncertain terms:

Woman's castration is defined as her having nothing you can see, as her having nothing. [...] Nothing like man. That is to say, no sex/organ that can be seen in a form capable of founding its reality, reproducing its truth. Nothing to be seen is equivalent to having no thing. No being and no truth (1985b, p. 48).

In psychoanalysis, woman is therefore a threat to its systems of knowledge because she is outside its modes of representation. She is a hole in men's signifying economy. A nothing that might cause the ultimate destruction, the splintering, the break in their systems of 'presence,' of 're-presentation' and 'representation' (1985b, p. 49, and 1985a, pp. 24–26). In addition, she writes that Lacan's theory of the subject misrepresents women's psychospatial experiences; for example he writes of identity in what he calls the 'mirror phase', the construction of a distorted view of the world in which, once again, a woman's actual experiences are not seen. Yet Irigaray's critique of Freud also celebrates the sexed subject's powers of disruption in the development of an alternative language of representation, and spaces for the sexed subject.

Two subsequent essays also continue this theme, showing that woman is misrepresented as an immaterial concept in the history of ideas. First, Irigaray argues that Aristotle's philosophy of physics and natural science restricts woman to the inadequate and excessive gap or hole in the system (1985b, p. 165).

Second, in the essay, 'La Mystérieque', she explores how a theological representation of ecstatic love (e.g. represented in Bernini's statue of St Teresa) casts woman into a permanent loss of reason (1985b, pp. 194–195). Finally, Irigaray misuses the process of mirroring by the curved mirror, the 'speculum', in order to show that these reflections amount to 'holes', not substantial expressions of women's lives (1985b, p. 144).

The essay, 'Volume without contours', however, has one of Irigaray's most intense double-edged examinations of these missing psychospatial holes and gaps in Western thinking, which are drawn out of the different etymological and cultural connotations of the word, 'écart'. Here, she analyses the multiple values of écart as; space, hole, gap, slit or the 'apartness' of woman in language. It is 'the gap, the space, the distance [écart, écartement] in which she finds herself, in which she is a hole again and is holed [se retrouve], [...] she will henceforth function as a hole [trou]'. (1991b, p. 57). Yet, in the next sentence, écart is also the 'opening' through which Irigaray promotes her economy of sexed spaces that are irreducible, but not merely excessive or immeasurable; 'And for her, metaphor will have the efficacy of a non-violating distance [écart] if it is 'empty of all appropriated meaning.' The word écart is therefore an important spatial hinge that indicates to the existence of heterogeneous spatio-temporalities. In this particular essay, however, these new sexed spaces cannot ultimately be fully actualised (1991b, pp. 57–66).

In a particularly labyrinthine form of architectural writing, Jennifer Bloomer has explored the spatiality of the line in architectural drawings and writings in Architecture and the Text: The (S)crypts of Joyce and Piranesi (1993). Then, in a later essay on this project, Bloomer describes these lines as cracks, which are 'the possibility of architecture', resonating strongly with Irigaray's discussion of the écart (Hughes 1996, p. 244).

Abysses and labyrinths

Irigaray's examination of the 'abyss' (another term for spaces beyond representation) is explored in the essay, 'Cosi fan tutti', and in her book on Nietzsche, Marine Lover. In the first text, Irigaray shows that the holes which
construct the psychic, and hence the linguistic formation of sexed subjects and spaces, are so deep or infinite that they constitute abysses. She writes: 'The lack of access to discourse in the body of the Other is transformed into intervals separating all women from one another. [. . .] But this fault, this gap, this hole, this abyss — in the operations of discourse — will turn out to be obscured as well by another substance: extension' (Irigaray 1985a, p. 98). Moreover, Irigaray equates this particular kind of 'unknowable depth' with rational definitions of infinity which the mathematical operation, topology, relies upon. Challenging how scientific definitions of topological spaces in modern science produce homogenous and indistinct infinities, she writes:

The place of the Other, the body of the Other, will then be spelled out in topology. At the point nearest to the coalescence of discourse and fantasy, in the truth of an ortho-graphy of space, the possibility of the sexual relation is going to be missed (1985a, p. 98).

Here, therefore, Irigaray describes a different relationship between space and time, in which the etymology of 'topos', meaning 'place', is emphasised, and out of which heterogeneous and particular bodies and places are constructed. Alternatively, in Marine Lover, she explores the construction of feminine space in Nietzsche's philosophy. In particular, examining the opposition between the sexed subject and sexed space, versus the transcendental flights and heights

Irigaray describes a different relationship between space and time, in which the etymology of 'topos', meaning 'place', is emphasised . . .

of knowledge that Nietzsche's 'Superman' attempts to reach. In contrast, Irigaray links woman to the irreducible, yet 'creative', depths of the sea, which threaten man's attempts to rationalise and control space (1991a, p. 52). This leads her to suggest that man's failed attempts to ‘overcome’ the infinity of the world also reveals the irreducible depths and risks that are inherent in the sea and the sexed subject, and which are not accountable to limited forms of representation. Therefore, the material excesses of woman and the sea represent a forgotten abyss in man's efforts to 'secure' safe ‘ground’ for his risky desires of omnipotence:

So, since the bottom has never been sounded, all realities and all truths about it remain on the level of superficial appearances. They move away from the bottom and muddy it with the material they have borrowed from it. That which has never been plumbed still hides in a night far deeper than your day has imagined (1991a, p. 60).

In addition, this text explores the unplanned occurrences, which disrupt rational attempts at problem-solving (of getting to the 'bottom' of a problem), and which may also characterise architectural design methods and practices. Here, therefore, Irigaray develops a critique of goal-driven methods through which the architect can explore how the discipline is constructed on the basis of ensuring secure 'ground', 'footings', 'foundations', and the need for structural and engineering knowledge to develop 'solutions' to these real physical problems, versus the disciplinary anxiety and professional risks that are produced when these solutions are not reached. For discussions of the contingent nature of architectural foundations see, for example, Debra Coleman's introduction (Coleman et al. 1996, p. xiii), Elizabeth Grosz's discussion of Irigaray's irreducible ground (2001, pp. 155–162) or Hilde Heynen's analysis of dwelling (Heynen and Baydar 2005, pp. 1–29).

The encounter with Nietzsche also provides a critique of the labyrinth, a spatial figure that architectural designers often associate with Luis Borges' writing (e.g. his collection of stories, Labyrinths, 1964). Although an appealing figure of spatio-temporal infinity, Irigaray shows that the labyrinth is descended from Greek mythology in which the sexed subject is primarily defined as 'lost' or a 'reflection' of the male subject (1991a, pp. 69–73). For Irigaray, Nietzsche perpetuates this negative representation of woman's relationship with labyrinths that is most explicitly expressed in the myth of Ariadne, who represents a powerful mythical figure of feminine reasoning, and who finds ways out of the labyrinth. However, despite its depth as a spatial figure for the sexed subject, Nietzsche’s labyrinth does not endow it with powers of liberation or transformation
embodied in Ariadne's experiences. Instead, woman is still primarily associated with representations of the labyrinth as a space of disorientation, rather than an independently reasoning and sensing sexed subject:

She is your labyrinth, you are hers. A path from you to yourself is lost in her, and from her to herself is lost in you. And if one looks only for a play of mirrors in all this, does one not create the abyss? Looking only for attractions to return into the first and only dwelling, does one not hollow out the abyss? (1991a, p. 73).

This essay is also reminiscent of Irigaray's discussion of Plato's 'receptacle' (the 'hystera', 'chora' or passage), another example of an irreducible labyrinthine space, which is 'unknowable' and therefore 'unreasonable' (i.e. beyond reason), for example, when she writes: 'The “receptacle” receives the marks of everything, understands and includes everything – except itself – but its relation to the intelligible is never actually established (1985a, p. 101).

These cautionary words about infinite space-times link to the criticism from architects and architectural critics, who advise architects to retain contingency in the process of design, and warn of the mistaken belief that architectural designs, processes, materials and collaborations can really be controlled by the designer (e.g. Sarah Wigglesworth in Rüedi et al. 2000, or Blundell Jones et al. 2005). However, I am not also arguing that architecture should give up its technical and scientific knowledge in responding to the real material and environmental needs of the twenty-first century. Rather, Irigaray's writing suggests developing approaches for implementing collaborative multi-sensory, technical, material and verbal languages, which respect the contribution and place of 'others' involved in the production of the built environment. In addition, her writing alerts architectural designers to the need for vigilance against the over-determination of representational techniques in the discipline. Yet she also indicates ways of enriching our powers of listening, engaging with and constructing our physical and social realities. In addition, her writing encourages participants in architecture to respond positively to the different psychic and physical experiences that are inside and outside the discipline's boundaries.

Envelopes, angels, bridges, horizons and thresholds

Throughout Irigaray's publications the importance of 'heterogeneous space-time' (1985b, p. 360) is evident. In the early texts it exists, but it is unreachable. However, in the later texts, especially in The Way of Love, it is an achievable 'reality' which is generated out of the encounter between sexed subjects; men and women, philosophers and sexed architects. In contrast to homogenous space and time, sexed spatio-temporality is determined by its inherent differences which exist as realities for all individuals. In the essay, 'When our lips speak', for example, this space-time is haptic (i.e. constructed out of touch). Social and psychic relations between individuals are developed out of their constantly changing psychic and spatial relationships:

No surface holds. No figure, line or point remains. No ground subsists. But no abyss, either. Depth, for us, is not a chasm. Without a solid crust, there is no precipice. Our depth is the thickness of our body, our all touching itself. Where top and bottom, inside and outside, in front and behind, above and below are not separated, remote, out of touch. Our all intermingled. Without breaks or gaps (1985a, p. 213).

In addition, in the context of architecture, heterogeneous space-time may therefore be generated out of sensing and sexed production of the built environment, in which the different needs of the individual are taken into account.

So, instead of the immeasurable infinity of the abyss or hole, heterogeneous space-time is developed out of the contingency of physical and psychic ways of living together with other people in society. Space and time are continuously differentiating inter-dependent relations, rather than logical representations of the same repetitive properties that fix sexed subjects into reductive formal languages or architectures. In the essay, 'Love of the same', for example, Irigaray explores these spatio-temporal relations in the figure of the 'nourishing envelope' that are haptic, bodily and social. In contrast, she argues that the topological figure of the Moebius strip operates on the basis of rational divisions between inside and outside space to produce restrictive 'enclosures' (1993a, p. 105). Alternatively, in another essay in the book called 'The envelope', she criticises Spinoza's limited version of the envelope that does not yet allow for
real, heterogeneous, haptic encounters between men and women. The desire for a ‘new’ way of constructing sexed cultures therefore drives Irigaray’s examination of space and time throughout her career, and in the essay, ‘Sexual difference’, she expresses this desire in a particularly spatial way:

The transition to a new age requires a change in our perception and conception of space-time, the inhabiting of places, and of containers, or envelopes of identity. It assumes and entails an evolution or a transformation of forms, of the relations of matter and form and of the interval between: the trilogy of the constitution of place (1993a, pp. 7–8).

Also in this essay, Irigaray explores the value of an irreducible, qualitative space-time in the figure of the angel, a theological power, which ‘is that which unceasingly passes through the envelope(s) or container(s), goes from one side to the other, reworking every deadline, changing every decision, thwarting all repetition’ (1993a, p. 15). Angels therefore represent active agents of transformation in space and time. In their role as messengers and figures of radical change they embody the ‘between’ or ‘interval’. Furthermore, in the form of Gabriel, angels are also associated with the production of sexed spaces and sexed subjects.

Then, in ‘Place, interval’, Irigaray also presents a critique of Aristotle’s disenfranchised space-time in a discussion of ‘interval’ and ‘place’. Irigaray suggests that Aristotle’s space-time is infinite, but passive, static and negative. However, she also observes that there are moments of actual transformation, for example, when fluid places are generated in the porous envelope between two bodies (1993a, p. 47). Once again, Irigaray cautiously speculates on the potential for positive concepts of sexed spatio-temporal figures which are haptic and irreducible. Also, later in the book, she shows how the spatial figure of the bridge is latent in Descartes’ writing. Overall, she considers Descartes’ text to be an account of homogeneous space and time. However, she also suggests that there is a heterogeneous spatio-temporality or bridge latent in the text, which may be available to the sexed subject (1993a, p. 75).

Women architects who have explored the envelope, angel or bridge, include the ‘atmospheric’ envelopes of Diller and Scofidio’s Blur Building (2002) and Françoise-Hélène Jourda’s design for the University of Marne la Vallée (1992–1995), which she describes as; ‘A thickness. A totally artificial interruption between interior and exterior that negotiates between architecture and the environment’ (Hughes 1996, p. 62). Vanessa Chase refers to Irigaray’s theory of the envelope and decoration (Coleman 1996, pp. 155–156), and Jane Rendell and Pamela Wells use Irigaray’s theory of the angel to rethink spatial relations between art and architecture (Hill 2001, pp. 131–158). Amy Landsberg and Lisa Quatrare’s drawing project ‘See angel touch’ uses ‘the cornice of angels’ on Louis Sullivan’s Bayard Building in New York to create an imaginary additional floor (Coleman et al. 1996, pp. 60–71); and Merrill Elam’s reflections on her designs also explore productive bridges between theory and practice (Hughes 1996, pp. 182–199).

Irigaray then calls upon architects to build continuously changing ‘thresholds’ that embody the physical, tactile and emotional power of relationships between individuals.

Alternatively, one of the most positive space-times that Irigaray constructs is in the gesture of the caress or touch between loving subjects. Here, intimate relations enable ‘envelopments’, ‘horizons’ or the ‘becoming’ of the subject, in relation to the space that the other (subject) inhabits. The sexed subject is produced out of the specific qualities of respect and shared intimacy with the other, constituting a ‘becoming in which the other gives of a space-time that is still free’ (1993a, p. 207). Also, later in this essay, Irigaray develops one of her most explicit and optimistic references to architectural thinking in a speculation of how to construct the world out of this heterogeneous space-time, desire (or jouissance) when she writes: ‘Architects are needed. Architects of beauty who fashion jouissance – a very subtle material. Letting it be and building with it’ (1993a, p. 214).
Irigaray then calls upon architects to build continuously changing ‘thresholds’ that embody the physical, tactile and emotional power of relationships between individuals.

Beatriz Colomina’s essay ‘Battle Lines: E.1027’, for example, presents an architectural interpretation of the horizon when she discusses the desire for a new sense of space, a new architecture, in which interior and exterior are no longer clear-cut divisions when discussing Le Corbusier’s use of photography in Privacy and Publicity (1996). Colomina writes of how this argument developed from her reading Heidegger’s discussion of the horizon; ‘In this new sense of space, the traditional distinctions between inside and outside have become profoundly blurred, transforming the role of the architect and modes of subjectivity’ (Hughes 1996, p. 4).

In one of her more recent publications, The Way of Love, Irigaray also develops a sexed spatio-temporality out of Heidegger’s philosophy. This contrasts with her earlier criticism of his ideas in The Forgetting of Air, where she argues that his philosophy forgets the importance of different spaces and times to build ‘porticos’ or ‘thresholds’ that delimit space and time (1999, pp. 34–35 and p. 96). However, in her later encounter with Heidegger, sexed relations between men and women are possible because time is spatial, but it is not an imitation of space. Instead, Irigaray views Heidegger’s notion of time to be irreducible because it is concerned with duration. When it is spatially embodied, time generates open spaces and modes of dwelling. She writes; ‘Time itself becomes space, doubles spatiality without for all that surrounding it. Time and space remain open while continuously constituting a dwelling place in which to stay’ (2002b, pp. 148–149).

Thus, Irigaray opens up Heidegger’s thinking for sexed subjects and sexed spaces, in particular, in relation to his theory of ‘dwelling’ (Sharr, 2007).

In the final section of this book, ‘Rebuilding the world’, spatial metaphors for sense-based, material and social connections between individuals in society abound. Drawing from the German poet-philosopher, Hölderlin, Irigaray develops a series of particularly architectural expressions of the material and linguistic links in order to build physical ‘places’ for sexed subject relations, and through which poetic ‘houses’ or languages can express these relationships.

Thus to dwell is, according to Hölderlin for example, a fundamental trait of the human condition. But being able to dwell would be tied to the act of constructing; without building, there would be no dwelling. A house, however, could be made of language and to construct could correspond to a poetic activity (2002b, p. 144).

Thus, she describes architectures of poetic construction, which enable life to endure, as ‘poetic ways of dwelling’ (2002b, p. 152). New gestures enable the irreducible differences of each individual to be actively embodied in the social relations. In addition, any bridge that is constructed between subjects is contingent, never absolutely definitive or fixed (2002b, p. 157). Rather, connections are developed out of the differences between individuals. In this respect, Irigaray calls for a shift in the value placed on ‘environments for living, like architecture’, from deterministic designs into which the individual is put as an afterthought, into ‘supports of the horizon’ or expressions of sexed relations (2002b, p. 171).

Reprinted in another recent anthology of Irigaray’s essays, Key Writings (2004), this final chapter of The Way of Love also demonstrates how Irigaray’s view of the potential for developing sexed spatio-temporal acts, gestures and languages dramatically shifts from her earlier critical enquiries into space and time. Here, she promotes productive ways to construct ‘sexuare cultures’ that physically, socially and politically express ‘sexuate difference’ in the material world, cities, institutions and homes for women and men today, and in the future (2004, p. xii). (The essay ‘How can we live together in a lasting way?’ in this publication, however, also shows that Irigaray’s critiques of systematic architectural processes are not always convincing.) Nevertheless, overall Irigaray’s later writing suggests a more positive belief that sexed architects exist and construct these new ‘poetic ways of dwelling’. Many of the architectural historians, theorists and designers to whom I’ve referred during the course of this book explicitly desire and explore poetic ways of producing critical and creative sexed architectures. In addition, the reference list at the end of the book indicates further sources through which to explore these diverse methods and practices, and others, in more detail.
Dialogue

Is it possible, or desirable, to control space and movement in an urban environment or a building?

What architectural styles are forgotten or overlooked in current architectural design? What are the gaps of knowledge in architectural history, theory, criticism and design?

What buildings or building types challenge or disrupt our experience of space, and how? In what ways might this be a positive experience?

In what ways is architecture a spatio-temporal experience? How do these interpretations help the user to understand architecture?

What historical examples of architecture offer multiple spatial experiences for the user?

How can architects build aesthetic or poetic buildings, which also respond to the different ways in which men, women and children live?

What are the benefits of horizons or contingent thresholds to architectural design, history, theory and criticism?

CHAPTER 8

Voices, Politics and Poetics

Irigaray's training in philosophy and psychoanalysis informs her discussions of space, time and matter, and the way in which these construct our understandings of architecture. This chapter shows how Irigaray's training in linguistics is also central to her analyses of sexed subjects and spaces. In Key Writings, for example, her academic training in linguistics and literature, and her career as a psychotherapist, inform her 'work on language' (2004, p. 35). Irigaray's examination of the politics of verbal expression – i.e. our speech and speech-acts – is present throughout her writings, but is particularly important in Thinking the Difference, I Love to You, and Democracy Begins Between Two. This chapter, therefore, explores how the sexed subject is embodied and